October 02,2011
US strategy influence on Japan’s nuclear energy policy (Part 4)
The need for stronger U.S. global leadership was the subject of a policy which the U.S. National Security Council emphasized in its strategic document (NSC5507/2) which was adopted on March 12, 1955.
At that time, the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in the practical use of power reactors and was planning to supply small-output nuclear reactors to third-world countries. In response to this, the NSC document calls for a U.S. policy of exporting nuclear reactors to the rest of the world, stating, “Using such U.S. leadership to promote cohesion within the free world and to forestall successful Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the world [is essential].”
Increasing overseas bases
The draft statement of the Policy on Atomic Power Abroad dated January 28, 1955 was more specific, and stated that the “peaceful uses of atomic energy” policy naturally leads to the U.S. having more overseas bases. The deception of the Eisenhower administration of trying to intensify the U.S. military strength in the name of “peace” is clear.
The NSC document stressed the part to be played by private corporations in constructing nuclear power reactors overseas. “The U.S. should actively encourage the work of private U.S. enterprise in the [nuclear] power reactor field abroad.”
At first, the U.S. government was skeptical about promoting the commercial use of atomic power. However, atomic power capable of producing an enormous amount of energy was a lucrative venture for the U.S. electric power companies. So they appealed to the government for an entry into nuclear power generation, saying that that would “support the foreign policy of the United States.” This bore fruit in the so-called Atomic Marshall Plan, which President John J. Hopkins of the General Dynamics Corp., who developed nuclear-powered submarines, compiled in December 1954 after the U.S. postwar plan for European restoration.
However, U.S. nuclear reactors at that time were unprofitable. The NSC document states, “So long as the economics of power reactors are uncertain, … small-output power reactors may be attractive … at a much lower cost per installation than for large-output power reactors.” It went on to state “Research reactors … are a natural step in the development of any nation’s capability to utilize atomic power when it becomes economically attractive.”
Japan in 1957 imported the U.S.-made experimental atomic reactor JRR1 and, from the 1970s, began to import U.S. light-water reactors, which was in accordance with the U.S. policy.
Target Japan
The NSC document referred to Japan as among industrialized nations with “power shortages and high power costs,” and asserted that these reasons will make Japan one of the “economically attractive locations for power reactors.”
However, there was another special need for introducing nuclear reactors into Japan.
(To be continued)
PREVIOUS >PART 3
NEXT >PART 5
The need for stronger U.S. global leadership was the subject of a policy which the U.S. National Security Council emphasized in its strategic document (NSC5507/2) which was adopted on March 12, 1955.
At that time, the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in the practical use of power reactors and was planning to supply small-output nuclear reactors to third-world countries. In response to this, the NSC document calls for a U.S. policy of exporting nuclear reactors to the rest of the world, stating, “Using such U.S. leadership to promote cohesion within the free world and to forestall successful Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the world [is essential].”
Increasing overseas bases
The draft statement of the Policy on Atomic Power Abroad dated January 28, 1955 was more specific, and stated that the “peaceful uses of atomic energy” policy naturally leads to the U.S. having more overseas bases. The deception of the Eisenhower administration of trying to intensify the U.S. military strength in the name of “peace” is clear.
The NSC document stressed the part to be played by private corporations in constructing nuclear power reactors overseas. “The U.S. should actively encourage the work of private U.S. enterprise in the [nuclear] power reactor field abroad.”
At first, the U.S. government was skeptical about promoting the commercial use of atomic power. However, atomic power capable of producing an enormous amount of energy was a lucrative venture for the U.S. electric power companies. So they appealed to the government for an entry into nuclear power generation, saying that that would “support the foreign policy of the United States.” This bore fruit in the so-called Atomic Marshall Plan, which President John J. Hopkins of the General Dynamics Corp., who developed nuclear-powered submarines, compiled in December 1954 after the U.S. postwar plan for European restoration.
However, U.S. nuclear reactors at that time were unprofitable. The NSC document states, “So long as the economics of power reactors are uncertain, … small-output power reactors may be attractive … at a much lower cost per installation than for large-output power reactors.” It went on to state “Research reactors … are a natural step in the development of any nation’s capability to utilize atomic power when it becomes economically attractive.”
Japan in 1957 imported the U.S.-made experimental atomic reactor JRR1 and, from the 1970s, began to import U.S. light-water reactors, which was in accordance with the U.S. policy.
Target Japan
The NSC document referred to Japan as among industrialized nations with “power shortages and high power costs,” and asserted that these reasons will make Japan one of the “economically attractive locations for power reactors.”
However, there was another special need for introducing nuclear reactors into Japan.
(To be continued)
PREVIOUS >PART 3
NEXT >PART 5
